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1. OPINION 
Article 35 CISG 
(1) The seller must deliver goods which are of the quantity, quality and description 
required by the contract and which are contained or packaged in the manner required 
by the contract. 
(2) Except where the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do not conform with 
the contract unless they: 
(a) are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description would ordinarily 
be used; 
(b) are fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known to the 
seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract, except where the circumstances show 
that the buyer did not rely, or that it was unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller’s 
skill and judgement; 
(c) possess the qualities of goods which the seller has held out to the buyer as a 
sample or model; 
(d) are contained or packaged in the manner usual for such goods or, where there 
is no such manner, in a manner adequate to preserve and protect the goods. 
(3) The seller is not liable under subparagraphs (a) to (d) of the preceding 
paragraph for any lack of conformity of the goods if at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract the buyer knew or could not have been unaware of such lack of conformity. 
 
1. The conformity of goods is determined not only by their quantity, 
quality, description, or packaging, but also by compliance with standards 
affecting the use of the goods, such as public law regulations and industry 
codes.    
2. The relevant standards are those at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract. 
3. Under Article 35(1), the seller must deliver goods which comply with 
the standards expressly or impliedly agreed upon. 
4. In assessing whether, under Article 35(2), the seller must deliver goods 
that comply with a given standard, the following factors may be taken into 
account: 
(a) the parties’ statements and conduct before and after the conclusion of 
the contract;   
(b) whether the buyer has drawn the seller’s attention to the standard; 
(c) whether the seller has expressed a public commitment to the standard; 
(d) any prior dealings between the parties; 
(e) the extent of the buyer’s involvement in designing the goods and 
advising the seller as to the manufacturing or production process; 
(f) the parties’ expertise in relation to the goods; 
(g) the business identity, characteristics, standing and size of the seller and 
the buyer; 
(h) whether the parties are in the same industry, trade, organisation, 
association or initiative that has adopted or follows the standard and 
whether compliance with the standard is required or expected; 
(i) the price; 
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(j) the nature, complexity and prominence of the standard; 
(k) the accessibility of information regarding the standard; 
(l) whether the standard is incorporated in the seller’s code of conduct or 
the buyer’s code of conduct for suppliers, provided that they are publicly 
available;  
(m) the existence of competing standards; 
(n) any relevant trade usage that is not based on the standard in question. 
5.1 The seller may have an obligation to deliver goods that comply with 
local standards:  
(a) applicable at the place of use of the goods if, at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract, the seller knew or could not have been unaware 
of that place; 
(b) in any other case, applicable at the buyer’s place of business. 
5.2 In assessing whether such standards are to be complied with, regard 
may be had to the following factors, in addition to those in Rule 4: 
(a) whether the seller knew or could not have been unaware of the relevant 
standard at the place of the intended use; 
(b) the seller’s prior dealings at that place, such as whether the seller had a 
branch or subsidiary or promoted goods of the same kind at that place; 
(c) whether the standard at that place is the same as that at the seller’s place 
of business. 
2. COMMENTS 
2.1. RULE 1 
1. The conformity of goods is determined not only by their quantity, 
quality, description, or packaging, but also by compliance with standards 
affecting the use of the goods, such as public law regulations and industry 
codes.    
2.1.1. STANDARDS  
1.1. Many products today have some corresponding standard(s) 
concerning their composition, features, such as health and safety, or the 
process to be followed in making them. A standard can be understood as 
a benchmark or a level of quality or attainment, with reference to which 
something is evaluated or the compliance with which is desirable or 
expected.1 The International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) 
defines a standard as ‘a document that provides requirements, 
specifications, guidelines or characteristics that can be used consistently to 
ensure that materials, products, processes and services are fit for their 
purpose’.2 It is helpful to distinguish ‘public’ from ‘private’ standards. The 
former are adopted by state organisations, often being contained in public 
law regulations, or by inter-governmental organisations, such the United 
Nations, International Labour Organisation or Codex Alimentarius 
Commission.3 Public standards can be mandatory or voluntary. Other 
standards are ‘private’ in the sense that they are produced by non-state 
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bodies, initiatives, associations and organisations. These can be: 
companies, adopting their own standards or codes of conduct, (such as 
Tesco Nature’s Choice)4; national industry bodies, such as the British 
Retail Consortium (BRC) and its BRC Global Standards;5 international 
consortia of companies and their global standards, such as GlobalG.A.P. 
(‘Good Agricultural Practice’),6 the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI)7 
or the Equator Principles (EP) Association;8 international organisations 
that adopt standards across various industries and sectors, such as the ISO 
that adopts standards in a wide range of areas, including technology, food 
safety, agriculture, healthcare, environment;9 civil society, represented by 
non-profit non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as the 
Fairtrade Foundation10 that promulgate what might called ‘ethical’ 
standards, concerning human rights, child labour and other labour 
standards, environmental protection, sustainability and corruption. Being 
adopted by non-state actors, private standards are voluntary. However, 
they can become mandatory or quasi-mandatory.11 The former is the case 
where a private standard is incorporated into a national regulatory 
framework.12 The example of the latter is where standards are applied by 
the majority of businesses in a particular sector and/or where compliance 
with such standards is required by large companies (usually, buyers) 
dominating the relevant sector or supply chain.13 
1.2. The existence of such standards raises the question of their 
relationship with the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods (CISG) that governs the rights and obligations of the parties 
arising from a ‘contract’ of the sale of goods. Being a contract law 
instrument that seeks to assign duties, risks, liabilities and remedies 
between the two contracting parties, the CISG is not concerned with 
giving effect to any such standards. However, buyers often claim that 
sellers breach a contract and/or the Convention if the goods do not meet 
a particular public or private standard. An important question therefore is: 
to what extent should such standards be taken into account in defining the 
seller’s obligations as to the conformity of goods under Article 35 CISG? 
This Opinion addresses this question, providing guidance as to the degree 
to which standards should be taken into account in interpreting a contract, 
governed by the CISG, and Article 35 CISG. 
2.1.2. DETERMINING THE CONFORMITY OF GOODS AND STANDARDS 
1.3. It is increasingly recognised that the conformity of goods 
comprises the relationship of the goods with their surrounding 
environment, of which standards are an important part.14 Thus, the 
conformity of goods should in principle be determined not only by their 
quantity, quality, description, or packaging, but also by compliance with 
standards affecting the use of the goods. According to Article 35(1) CISG, 
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the ‘conformity’ of goods comprises their quantity, quality, description, 
containment or packaging. Standards, whether public or private, are often 
concerned with these aspects of conformity, as well as with many others, 
such as technical, ethical, environmental and health and safety 
considerations and/or the process of designing, manufacturing or 
producing the goods. It must also be stressed that when interpreting the 
contract under Article 35(1), regard must be had to all relevant 
circumstances, as is made clear by Article 8(3) CISG.15 Given that 
standards deal with various aspects and features of the goods, the 
standards can be such a ‘relevant circumstance’ or factor that must be 
taken into account when interpreting the contract.  
1.4. Some key terms as to the conformity of goods, implied under 
Article 35(2), focus on the use of the goods. Article 35(2)(b) is concerned 
with the seller’s obligations where a particular purpose, for which the 
goods are intended to be used, has been made known to the seller. Article 
35(2)(a), in turn, provides a fall-back rule, according to which goods are to 
be ‘fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description would 
ordinarily be used’.16 Standards can affect the use of the goods, whether it 
is the use flowing from the particular purpose under Article 35(2)(b) or 
the ordinary use under Article 35(2)(a), including their containment or 
packaging (Article 35(2)(d)). Thus, if a standard is contained in public law 
regulations, the use of the goods may be affected if they do not comply 
with this standard. Even if a standard is not mandatory, companies in a 
given market, sector or supply chain may have to comply with such a 
standard in order to enter, remain in the market or carry on business 
effectively if such compliance is expected by within that market or sector17 
and/or required by a company dominating a supply chain (usually, the 
buyer).18 
2.2. RULE 2 
2. The relevant standards are those at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract. 
2.1. If a particular standard is in principle relevant to determining the 
conformity of goods under the CISG, the question arises as to the point 
in time with reference to which the standard in question is to be taken. 
The question is important where the standard in question changes 
subsequent to the time of the conclusion of the contract, such as where 
new scientific evidence about an aspect of the goods19 or suspicions about 
the goods being unsafe emerge after the contract is made.20 The 
Convention’s general rule in Article 36(1) is that the seller is liable for a 
lack of conformity which exists ‘at the time when the risk passes to the 
42 
 
buyer’.21 However, this point is for assessing the seller’s conformity 
obligations in their entirety and it needs to be distinguished from the point 
in time at which a particular standard is to be taken. The timing of a 
standard is more closely aligned with the parties’ agreement than with the 
time of the passage of risk and, specifically, with the allocation of risks 
between the parties. For this reason, the relevant standards are those at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract. Whether the goods in fact meet 
the relevant standards is, however, to be assessed with reference to the 
time when the risk passes to the buyer, as required by Article 36(1). 
2.2. It can be argued that in determining the seller’s obligations as to 
the conformity of goods it is ‘artificial’ to ignore changes in standards, 
arising after the contract is made, particularly if they arise because of the 
newly emerging scientific evidence that becomes available at the time of 
legal proceedings.22 However, if changes to standards made after the 
contract is made are taken into account, the seller’s conformity obligations 
can never be tested with reference to a fixed point in time and would be 
continuously subject to any changes in standards occurring up to the time 
of legal proceedings.23 Such a position would be unfair and unsettling to 
sellers. In contrast, the time of making the contract is when the contracting 
parties assume risks associated with their contractual performance. Taking 
standards at the time of the conclusion of the contract promotes legal 
certainty and predictability that parties need to be able to effectively and 
reliably plan and manage their potential risks, liabilities and costs. The 
contracting parties’ intention may be that the seller ought to comply with 
standards, affecting the use of the goods, as they are at a time subsequent 
to the conclusion of the contract. If so, such an intention needs to be made 
clear in the contract, so as to effectively derogate from the rule that the 
relevant standards are those at the time of the conclusion of the contract. 
2.3. RULE 3 
3. Under Article 35(1), the seller must deliver goods which comply 
with the standards expressly or impliedly agreed upon. 
3.1. Based on the principle of freedom of contract, Article 35(1) 
CISG gives primacy to the contract.24 If the contract requires the seller to 
deliver goods that comply with a particular standard, the seller is in breach 
of contract if the goods do not comply with the contractually specified 
standard. The parties can expressly incorporate a given standard or, 
alternatively, a document, such as public law regulations or an industry 
code, that contain a standard.25 Some such standards may be concerned 
with the goods’ physical features, whereas some others focus on the 
manufacturing process, setting out, for instance, benchmarks of safety, 
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sustainability, duties of care, environmental protection or ethical 
considerations.26 
3.2. Article 8 CISG makes clear that the parties may agree on the 
need for the goods to comply with a certain standard implicitly. Whether 
that is the parties’ intention needs to be determined by interpreting their 
statements and conduct in the light of all relevant circumstances of the 
case, such as those set out in Article 8(3).27 An implicit intention that the 
goods ought to comply with a particular standard may be inferred, for 
example, from the practice established between the parties or by virtue of 
a trade usage to this effect.28 In some cases, a contract, whilst lacking an 
express provision, may still contain formulations that reflect the intention 
for the goods to comply with a certain standard, such as where: the 
contract provides that the goods are to be ‘CE approved’;29 and, before 
the contract was made, the seller had known that the goods were to be 
used in the European Union and had presented itself to the buyer as an 
international supplier with the CE certification. In this case, the parties 
can be taken to have intended, by virtue of Article 8(3) CISG, that the 
seller was required to deliver goods that comply with standards in the 
Directives of the European Community.30 
3.3. More difficult cases for determining whether there was an 
implicit intention for a seller to comply with a certain standard are those 
where there are no relevant contractual provisions. All relevant 
circumstances need to be taken into account and balanced against one 
another, as is exemplified by a CISG case31 that concerned a sale of wheat 
flour by a Dutch seller to a Belgian buyer for further resale to 
Mozambique. The seller had added a substance containing potassium 
bromate, capable of causing cancer and damaging DNA structures, to the 
flour which upon delivery to Mozambique was confiscated by the 
authorities. There was evidence that the import of flour enriched with 
potassium bromate was de facto permitted in Mozambique and that a 
company appointed by the Mozambican government had tested the 
batches of wheat before shipment and had issued a Clean Report for the 
purpose of an import license. The court held the seller liable. First, it was 
evident from the pre-contractual exchanges between the parties that the 
quality of the flour was very important to the buyer and that the seller 
declared the flour to be of very high quality. It was held that the buyer 
could reasonably interpret the seller’s statement as warranting that the 
bread improvers would be of a quality corresponding, at least, to 
international standards. Secondly, the use of potassium bromate had been 
banned in the Netherlands and in the EU, of which the seller was aware. 
Thirdly, it was also prohibited by the Codex Alimentarius, an international 
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public standard,32 which both the Netherlands and Mozambique have 
agreed to use and, for this reason, the court regarded the Codex as the 
‘appropriate general standard’. Taken together, these factors pointed 
towards the seller’s liability, overriding a contrary factor, namely, that the 
import of such goods to Mozambique was de facto permitted.33  
3.4. The parties’ implicit intention that the goods ought to comply 
with a given standard should not be inferred lightly. If a buyer wants to 
ensure such compliance, the buyer can bargain for and contractually 
incorporate such an obligation of the seller.34 This point is particularly 
relevant in global supply chains where the end-buyers are often the ones 
setting the standards throughout the chain:35 a powerful and sophisticated 
commercial party’s failure to expressly incorporate a standard, the 
compliance with which it later demands, into the contract points to the 
intention not to require the seller to comply with it. Some regard should 
also be had to a close relationship and potential overlap between inferring 
an implicit intention under Article 35(1) and implying a term that the 
goods must be fit for any particular purpose impliedly made known to the 
seller under Article 35(2)(b)).36 Article 35(2)(b) is subject to two 
restrictions: (1) that in Article 35(3);37 and (2) the displacement of the rule 
in Article 35(2)(b), where the circumstances show that the buyer did not 
rely or it was unreasonable for the buyer to rely on the seller’s skill and 
judgement. Article 35(1) is not subject to the same restrictions,38 but it 
should not be seen and used as a way of establishing the seller’s liability by 
means of a lower threshold39  because, in contrast with Article 35(2)(b),40 
it requires a term to be contractually incorporated.  
2.4. RULE 4 
4. In assessing whether, under Article 35(2), the seller must deliver 
goods that comply with a given standard, the following factors may be 
taken into account: 
(a) the parties’ statements and conduct before and after the 
conclusion of the contract;   
(b) whether the buyer has drawn the seller’s attention to the standard; 
(c) whether the seller has expressed a public commitment to the 
standard; 
(d) any prior dealings between the parties; 
(e) the extent of the buyer’s involvement in designing the goods and 
advising the seller as to the manufacturing or production process; 
(f) the parties’ expertise in relation to the goods; 
(g) the business identity, characteristics, standing and size of the 
seller and the buyer; 
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(h) whether the parties are in the same industry, trade, organisation, 
association or initiative that has adopted or follows the standard and 
whether compliance with the standard is required or expected; 
(i) the price; 
(j) the nature, complexity and prominence of the standard; 
(k) the accessibility of information regarding the standard; 
(l) whether the standard is incorporated in the seller’s code of 
conduct or the buyer’s code of conduct for suppliers, provided that they 
are publicly available;  
(m) the existence of competing standards; 
(n) any relevant trade usage that is not based on the standard in 
question. 
2.4.1. GENERAL 
4.1. The CISG implies a number of terms relating to the conformity 
of goods, unless the parties have agreed otherwise (Article 35(2)). These 
terms are those requiring the goods to be: ‘fit for the purposes for which 
goods of the same description would ordinarily be used’ (Article 35(2)(a));  
‘any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known to the seller at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract’ (Article 35(2)(b)); ‘possess the 
qualities of goods which the seller has held out to the buyer as a sample 
or model’ (Article 35(2)(c)); ‘are contained or packaged in the manner 
usual for such goods or, where there is no such manner, in a manner 
adequate to preserve and protect the goods’ (Article 35(2)(d)). As 
explained, the existence of a standard, affecting the use of the goods, can 
be a factor in determining the conformity of goods under these terms 
implied under the Convention.  
4.2. The tests implied under Article 35(2) are highly fact-sensitive 
and need to be interpreted within the context surrounding the contract, of 
which standards affecting the use of the goods are a part. Whether 
compliance with a given standard is part of the conformity under these 
implied tests must be determined on a case-by-case basis. A wide range of 
factors may then be relevant to deciding whether a given standard should 
influence the seller’s conformity obligations under Article 35(2). The 
factors may be conflicting in that some factors may point in favour of the 
seller’s liability, whereas some others may point in favour of the seller’s 
not being responsible for complying with the standard in question. The 
weight to be attributed to each factor is a matter of the particular 
circumstances of the case. Determining the seller’s conformity obligations 
under Article 35(2) should ultimately be the result of a careful balance of 
all the relevant factors, set out in Rule 4(a)-(n). 
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2.4.2. THE PARTIES’ STATEMENTS AND CONDUCT BEFORE AND AFTER THE 
CONCLUSION OF THE CONTRACT 
4.3. What the parties say or do before or after the conclusion of the 
contract can be highly relevant to determining conformity under Article 
35(2).41 The examples of pre-contractual statements or conduct pointing 
in favour of a given standard being relevant to determining conformity 
under Article 35(2) include:42 the seller’s presenting itself as a supplier of 
high quality products, who complies with ‘all applicable standards’,43 or 
gives assurances that its products will be acceptable to the industry;44 or 
the buyer’s stressing the importance and/or its expectation of receiving 
high quality goods45 meeting the relevant standards. Another example is 
where, before the contract is made, the seller makes a public commitment, 
such as that published in the press or publicised in a press release, to 
observing a certain standard. The publicly expressed commitment to a 
certain standard creates a reasonable expectation that the seller will follow 
this standard in its contracts with its counter-parties and can be relevant 
to determining conformity under Article 35(2).46  
4.4. The same statements and conduct can feature both before and 
after the contract is made. For instance, the seller may continuously, 
before and after making the contract, advertise itself as a member of a 
particular industry association and present this association’s logo in its pre- 
and post-contractual communications with the buyer.47 If so, these 
representations by the seller are relevant to determining conformity under 
Article 35(2) with reference to a standard adopted by this industry 
association. An example of the relevant post-contractual conduct is the 
buyer’s reliance on the goods’ compliance with a given standard,48 such as 
where after making the contract with its seller the buyer: makes the resale 
arrangements of the goods to be delivered by the seller; and represents to 
its sub-buyer or incorporates a term into a sub-sale contract that the goods 
will comply with that standard. 
2.4.3. WHETHER THE BUYER HAS DRAWN THE SELLER’S ATTENTION TO 
THE STANDARD 
4.5. Whether the buyer has drawn a particular standard to the seller’s 
attention is likely to indicate the relevance of that standard to determining 
conformity under Article 35(2). The buyer’s making known to the seller 
the need to comply with a given standard is likely to trigger the seller’s 
obligation under Article 35(2)(b)49 (namely, that the particular purpose of 
the intended use of the goods requires compliance with that standard). In 
contrast, the buyer’s merely making known to the seller the existence of a 
standard may fall short of a clear communication of a particular purpose 
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under Article 35(2)(b). However, such a communication is still part of the 
context against which Article 35(2)(b) and Article 35(2)(a) and (d) are to 
be interpreted because it signals the importance of the standard to the 
buyer; otherwise, the buyer would not have mentioned its existence to the 
seller. 
2.4.4. WHETHER THE SELLER HAS EXPRESSED A PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO 
THE STANDARD 
4.6. The seller may express a public commitment to observing 
particular standards, such those made in the press, publicised press 
releases or its publicised codes of conduct.50 Such public commitments are 
part of the context against which terms implied under Article 35(2) should 
be interpreted. Such a commitment can be relevant, for example, to 
determining what constitutes the ordinary use of the goods (Article 
35(2)(a)) or the ‘usual manner’ in which goods are to be contained or 
packaged (Article 35(2)(d)), particularly if other suppliers in the same 
sector have also declared their adherence to these standards. The fitness 
for a particular purpose test (Article 35(2)(b)) is less relevant because the 
seller’s expression of its commitment to a standard does not normally 
communicate a particular purpose for which the buyer intends to use the 
goods (the first part of Article 35(2)(b)).51 However, this factor is highly 
relevant to determining whether the buyer relied or whether it was 
reasonable for the buyer to rely on the seller’s skill and judgement (the 
second part of Article 35(2)(b)). 
4.7. Generally, there is tension between a seller’s declaration of 
commitment to particular standards, particularly those of ethical nature,52 
and its argument that it does not have an obligation to comply with them. 
From a policy perspective, it may be desirable for sellers to have such an 
obligation because by making public declarations of commitment to 
certain standards, companies often seek to induce the public to do 
business with them or promote a positive commercial image. Holding 
sellers liable for non-compliance with the declared standards helps protect 
the public and encourages sellers to stay true to their public 
representations.53 
2.4.5. PRIOR DEALINGS BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
4.8. Prior dealings between the parties can reveal their knowledge, 
individual expectations as well as expectations in the relevant commercial 
environment, all of which are part of the context against which Article 
35(2) is to be interpreted. If the parties’ previous contract(s) for the same 
goods required the seller to comply with the standard in question or to 
48 
 
deliver certificates showing compliance with it,54 this factor can point to 
the relevance of that standard for determining the goods’ fitness for a 
particular purpose.55 The parties’ incorporation of that standard in their 
previous contract(s) may also reflect a broad understanding within their 
respective commercial sector or market concerning what constitutes the 
‘ordinary use’ of the goods (Article 35(2)(a)) or the ‘usual manner’ of their 
containment or packaging (Article 35(2)(d)). Even if their previous 
contract(s) for the same goods did not expressly require compliance with 
a given standard, but the seller observed that standard in performing those 
contract(s), that fact can still be relevant. For instance, the buyer may rely 
on the expected compliance with the standard by representing to its sub-
buyer that the goods will comply with that standard. If the seller was aware 
of such a representation before making the contract with the buyer, this 
factor together with the seller’s prior observance of the standard can point 
in favour of the implicit communication of a particular purpose to the 
seller (Article 35(2)(b)). 
4.9. Caution is needed, however, in deciding whether a seller’s 
obligation to comply with a particular standard should be implied under 
Article 35(2) based on the parties’ previous dealings. A powerful 
countervailing consideration is that, in the examples in paragraph 4.8, the 
buyer has not incorporated any such term in the contract or has not 
expressly communicated a relevant particular purpose under Article 
35(2)(b), which is not difficult to do. This may well evidence that the 
parties did not intend the seller to comply with the standard.56  
2.4.6. THE EXTENT OF THE BUYER’S INVOLVEMENT IN DESIGNING THE 
GOODS AND ADVISING THE SELLER AS TO THE MANUFACTURING OR 
PRODUCTION PROCESS 
4.10. The buyer’s involvement in designing the goods and advising 
the seller as to the manufacturing or production process is a factor 
pointing against implying a duty on the seller to comply with a standard. 
In this case, the seller is to some degree relying on the buyer in terms of 
how the contract ought to be performed. The greater the buyer’s 
involvement, the greater is the weight to be attributed to this factor in 
pointing to the parties’ intention that the seller was not expected to comply 
with a standard. Otherwise, the buyer would have communicated the need 
to comply with the standard during its involvement in designing the goods 
or when advising the seller. The seller’s reliance on the buyer57 also points 
against implying a term under Article 35(2)(b) because the buyer does not 
rely or it is unreasonable for the buyer to rely on the seller’s skill and 
judgement.  
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2.4.7. THE PARTIES’ EXPERTISE IN RELATION TO THE GOODS 
4.11. The level and balance of the parties’ expertise in relation to the 
goods are a factor with particular relevance under Article 35(2)(b). The 
greater the buyer’s expertise, the greater is the expectation that the buyer 
will draw the need to comply with a standard to the seller’s attention, 
triggering the seller’s obligation under Article 35(2)(b).58 The implicit 
communication of a particular purpose (the first part of Article 35(2)(b)) 
should not therefore be inferred lightly where the buyer possesses 
substantial expertise. If the buyer’s expertise in respect of the goods is 
equal to or greater than that of the seller,59 that may also lead to the 
conclusion that the buyer does not rely or that it is unreasonable for the 
buyer to rely on the seller’s skill and judgement (the second part of Article 
35(2)(b)). 
2.4.8.  THE BUSINESS IDENTITY, CHARACTERISTICS, STANDING AND SIZE 
OF THE SELLER AND THE BUYER 
4.12. Various characteristics relating to the identity, characteristics, 
standing and size of the parties’ business can be relevant to determining 
conformity under Article 35(2). If both parties have well-known and 
established reputations as ethical businesses, the seller’s obligation to 
comply with an ethical standard may be implied under various tests under 
Article 35(2). The seller will be aware of the buyer’s identity as an ethical 
business and, being such a business itself, the seller’s skill and judgement 
may well be relied upon by the buyer (the second part of Article 35(2)(b)). 
Similar reasoning can apply even where only the buyer has a strong 
reputation as ethical business, but the seller knows that the buyer always 
sells goods at markets, specialising in organic or fair trade products, or 
where the focus on ethical standards is evident from the name of the 
buyer’s business.60 These circumstances may suffice to implicitly 
communicate to the seller that the goods’ intended use requires 
compliance with certain ethical standards (the first part of Article 
35(2)(b)).61 However, if the buyer has greater expertise in relation to ethical 
goods than the seller, that may point against the buyer’s reliance on the 
seller’s skill and judgement (the second part Article 35(2)(b)).62 
4.13. If both parties identify themselves and have reputations as 
ethical businesses, possibly also reflecting the ethical nature of the 
market/sector in which they operate, that can mean that: the particular 
purpose of use of the goods requires compliance with certain ethical 
standards (Article 35(2)(b));63 the goods’ ordinary use (Article 35(2)(a)) or 
‘usual’ manner of packaging or containment (Article 35(2)(d)) should also 
be interpreted with reference to such standards.64 
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4.14. The size of and resources available to the parties are also of 
relevance. Compare one seller, a large multinational company with 
considerable resources, with another who is a small inexperienced 
company with inconsiderable resources. It is reasonable to expect the 
former to investigate and/or have much greater knowledge of the 
existence and content of standards affecting the use of the goods.65 The 
knowledge of a particular purpose, requiring compliance with such 
standards, can be implied under Article 35(2)(b) more readily in respect of 
the former seller, than the latter.  
4.15. If the buyer is a large multinational business, it can also be 
expected to investigate or know about the existence and content of the 
relevant standards and draw the seller’s attention to them. This factor in 
itself demands caution when deciding whether to infer an implicit 
communication of a particular purpose (the first part of Article 35(2)(b)). 
The buyer’s superior access to resources can mean that there is no reliance 
on the seller’s skill and judgement (the second part of Article 35(2)(b)). 
Conversely, if the buyer is a small company with inconsiderable resources, 
there is much lower expectation that this buyer would know the relevant 
standards and their content. In itself, this factor sets the scene for a lower 
threshold for inferring an implicit communication of a particular purpose 
under Article 35(2)(b).  
2.4.9. WHETHER THE PARTIES ARE IN THE SAME INDUSTRY, TRADE, 
ORGANISATION, ASSOCIATION OR INITIATIVE THAT HAS ADOPTED 
OR FOLLOWS THE STANDARD AND WHETHER COMPLIANCE WITH 
THE STANDARD IS REQUIRED OR EXPECTED 
4.16. Where the parties are in the same industry, trade, organisation, 
association or initiative that has adopted or follows the standard and where 
compliance with the standard is required or expected, this factor can 
implicitly communicate to the seller that the particular purpose of using 
the goods necessitates compliance with that standard (Article 35(2)(b)).66 
This factor also indicates a common commercial context within which the 
parties operate. Therefore, compliance with that standard can be part of 
the ‘ordinary use’ of the goods (Article 35(2)(a)) or of the ‘usual manner’ 
of containment or packaging (Article 35(2)(d)). 
2.4.10. THE PRICE*67 
4.17. The price can be a powerful indicator of what can be expected 
of the goods from the perspectives of tests in Article 35(2). If the contract 
price corresponds to high quality or premium goods that are associated 
with a particular standard, this price points in favour of an implicit 
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communication of a particular purpose that requires compliance with this 
standard (Article 35(2)(b)). Conversely, if the price is much lower than the 
value of high-quality/premium goods, associated with this standard, this 
points against inferring an implicit communication of such a particular 
purpose.     
4.18. Generally, a low contract price indicates that the goods were 
not intended to be premium goods.68 So, even if compliance with a certain 
standard would otherwise be required under Article 35(2), an 
uncharacteristically low price can evidence that the goods were not 
intended to comply with any standard.69  
2.4.11. THE NATURE, COMPLEXITY AND PROMINENCE OF THE STANDARD 
4.19. The nature of a standard, such as whether it is mandatory or 
voluntary, is relevant under Article 35(2). If the buyer is aware of the 
mandatory character of a standard, it can be reasonably expected to draw 
this standard to the seller’s attention. This factor on its own points to a 
high threshold for implying a seller’s duty under Article 35(2)(b). The 
seller’s awareness of the relevant standard and its mandatory nature sets the 
context for implying an obligation under Article 35(2)(b) more readily than 
in the previous example. The mandatory nature of a standard can also 
make it relevant to determining the goods’ ‘ordinary use’ (Article 35(2)(a)) 
or ‘usual manner’ of containment or packaging (Article 35(2)(d)).70 
4.20. If a standard is voluntary or advisory, the weight to be 
attributed to it depends largely on its significance in practice. If, despite 
being voluntary, the standard is widely expected to be complied with in a 
relevant market, industry or sector, it should be treated similarly to 
mandatory standards (quasi-mandatory).71 Another example of its 
significance is where its voluntary character is temporary, with it being 
widely expected that it will inevitably become mandatory.72 In these 
examples, the standard is relevant to determining a particular purpose 
(Article 35(2)(b)), ‘ordinary use’ (Article 35(2)(a)) and the ‘usual manner’ 
of containment or packaging (Article 35(2)(d)). If the standard does not 
have such practical significance, its relevance is much weaker. 
4.21. High complexity of a standard can decrease its relevance under 
Article 35(2). If compliance with such a standard requires special 
knowledge, expertise, experience or resources, this factor points against 
inferring an implicit communication of a particular purpose to the seller 
without such knowledge, expertise and resources (the first part of Article 
35(2)(b)).73 Its skill and judgement are also unlikely to be relied upon (the 
second part of Article 35(2)(b)). The relevance of such a standard may also 
be weak under Article 35(2)(a) or (d). These tests are premised on a 
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common understanding or acceptance, within a trade or market, of what 
constitutes the goods’ ‘ordinary use’ or ‘usual manner’ of containment or 
packaging. If a market comprises a wide range of parties with different 
levels of business sophistication, it is unlikely that a highly complex 
standard, which is difficult for many parties to follow, has gained general 
acceptance.  
4.22. The more prominent a standard, whether private or public, the 
greater is its relevance for inferring an implicit communication of a 
particular purpose (Article 35(2)(b)) and determining the ‘ordinary use’ 
(Article 35(2)(a)) or the ‘usual manner’ of containment or packaging 
(Article 35(2)(d)). 
2.4.12. THE ACCESSIBILITY OF INFORMATION REGARDING THE STANDARD 
4.23. The more accessible the information regarding the standard, 
the greater is its relevance under Article 35(2). If this information is 
publicly visible, easily found and identifiable (eg, via internet search 
engines and identifiable without difficulty on a relevant webpage), 
available in widely spoken languages (eg, English), this sets a favourable 
context for the seller to be in a position to know about the existence and 
content of the standard, affecting the use of the goods, and consequently 
the need to comply with it (Article 35(2)(b)). These factors are also 
conducive to this standard being relevant under Article 35(2)(a) and (d).  
2.4.13. WHETHER THE STANDARD IS INCORPORATED IN THE SELLER’S 
CODE OF CONDUCT OR THE BUYER’S CODE OF CONDUCT FOR 
SUPPLIERS, PROVIDED THAT THEY ARE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE 
4.24. The considerations in paragraphs 4.6 and 4.7 are applicable to 
cases where the standard is incorporated in the seller’s code of conduct. 
The incorporation of the standard in the buyer’s code of conduct can also 
be relevant in the context of Article 35(2). In principle, such incorporation 
can implicitly make known to the seller a particular purpose that the 
intended use requires compliance with those standards (Article 35(2)(b)). 
Such an interpretation can only be adopted if two conditions are met, 
whereby the seller can be expected to know about the standard and the 
need to comply with it. First, the buyer’s code of conduct must be 
addressed to its suppliers, rather than being its internal code. Secondly, 
this code must be publicly available and otherwise accessible74 to the seller. 
At the same time, the buyer’s failure to expressly incorporate the standard 
in the contract is a countervailing factor militating against implying an 
obligation under Article 35(2)(b) lightly. This factor may even warrant the 
conclusion that the seller was not intended to comply with the standard 
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because the tests under Article 35(2) that could otherwise lead to such an 
obligation are not applicable.75 
4.25. The incorporation of the standard in the seller’s code or the 
buyer’s code for its suppliers can also be relevant under Article 35(2)(a) 
and (d). For example, the incorporation of the standard in the end-buyer’s 
code for its suppliers may be relevant to what constitutes the ‘ordinary use’ 
or ‘usual manner’ of containment or packaging in the context of a 
particular supply chain. However, this consideration needs to be counter-
balanced against the buyer’s failure to incorporate the standard in the 
contract or communicate it clearly to the seller, which can point strongly 
to the intention that no compliance with the standard was required.  
2.4.14. THE EXISTENCE OF COMPETING STANDARDS 
4.26. The existence of competing standards can militate against the 
relevance of the standard in question to implying obligations under Article 
35(2)(a), (b) or (d).76 This is particularly so if the standards are of similar 
prominence and/or the extent to which they are followed in a relevant 
market, sector or industry is also similar. In these circumstances, there is 
no one standard that can claim common acceptance so as to be relevant 
to determining the ‘ordinary use’ or the ‘usual manner’ of containment or 
packaging (Article 35(2)(a) and (d)). It may also be difficult to establish an 
implicit communication that the use of the goods required their 
compliance with the standard in question, as opposed to other existing 
standards (Article 35(2)(b)).  
2.4.15. ANY RELEVANT TRADE USAGE THAT IS NOT BASED ON THE 
STANDARD IN QUESTION 
4.27. If a trade usage is based on the standard in question, an 
obligation of comply with it will be implied by virtue of contract 
interpretation under Article 35(1).77 Therefore, in determining the seller’s 
obligations under Article 35(2), a usage is relevant insofar as it is not based 
on this standard. A usage in a given trade sector may be of general nature, 
requiring sellers to comply with the applicable industry standards. In this 
example, a usage is not based on any particular standard, but requires 
compliance with industry standards in general. Conversely, a usage may 
provide that sellers are not required to comply with any standards, unless 
specifically informed to the contrary by their buyers; or may be based on 
a standard other than that in question. In these latter examples, the 
standard in question is not relevant under Article 35(2). 
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2.5. RULE 5.1 
The seller may have an obligation to deliver goods that comply with 
local standards:  
(a) applicable at the place of use of the goods if, at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract, the seller knew or could not have been unaware 
of that place; 
(b) in any other case, applicable at the buyer’s place of business. 
2.5.1. APPLICABILITY AT THE PLACE OF USE OF THE GOODS  
5.1. Rule 5.1 is concerned with standards that are specific to a 
particular place (local standards). It provides for general fall-back guidance 
as to whether under Article 35(2) the seller must comply with local 
standards at the place of use of the goods. Different positions are 
advanced in cases and commentary on whether, by default, the seller is 
required under Article 35(2) to comply with such local standards. 
Considering the significance of this question and the divergence of views, 
it is important for there to be a steer as to how risks should be allocated 
between the contracting parties in order to promote legal certainty, 
consistency and uniformity in the Convention’s application.78 According 
to Rule 5.1(a), the seller may have an obligation to comply with local 
standards applicable at the place of use of the goods if, at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract, the seller knew or could not have been unaware 
of that place. Thus, subject to various factors that may be relevant,79 Rule 
5.1(a) signals its preferred allocation of risk: namely, the seller should have 
an obligation to comply with local standards at the place of use of the 
goods.80 The rationale is twofold. First, if the seller knew or could not have 
been unaware of the place of use of the goods, it should investigate the 
existence of any local standards, affecting the use of the goods.81 If they 
exist, it is reasonable to expect the seller to understand that compliance 
with local standards is necessary or required. Secondly, this position is in 
line with how the Convention allocates risks between the contracting 
parties in the context of the question whether the seller has an obligation 
to deliver goods free from rights or claims of a third party based on 
industrial property or other intellectual property (IP).82 As Article 42(1)(a) 
CISG makes clear, the seller does have such an obligation if the right or 
claim is based on IP ‘under the law of the State where the goods will be 
resold or otherwise used, if it was contemplated by the parties at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract that the goods would be resold or 
otherwise used in that State’. 
2.5.2. APPLICABILITY AT THE BUYER’S PLACE OF BUSINESS 
5.2. Rule 5.1(b) is applicable where the seller neither knew nor could 
not have been unaware of the place of use of the goods. In this case, 
subject to various relevant factors,83 the seller may have an obligation to 
comply with standards applicable at the buyer’s place of business. The 
rationale is that in this situation it is reasonable for the seller to expect that 
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the goods will be used at the place where the buyer has its place of 
business. Therefore, if there are local standards at that place, affecting the 
use of the goods, such standards should be complied with.84 This approach 
is once again line with the Convention’s allocation of risk in the context 
of rights or claims arising from IP. If Article 42(1)(a) is not applicable, 
under Article 42(1)(b) the seller has an obligation to deliver goods free 
from third parties’ IP rights or claims ‘under the law of the State where 
the buyer has his place of business’. 
2.6. RULE 5.2 
5.2 In assessing whether such standards are to be complied with, 
regard may be had to the following factors, in addition to those in Rule 4: 
(a) whether the seller knew or could not have been unaware of the 
relevant standard at the place of the intended use 
2.6.1. GENERAL  
5.3. The fall-back guidance in Rule 5.1 is not prescriptive as it does 
no more than provide that the seller may have an obligation to comply with 
local standards in places specified in Rule 5.1(a) and (b). This is so because 
the question whether the seller has an obligation under Article 35(2) to 
comply with local standards is highly fact-sensitive. Determining whether 
the seller has such an obligation is ultimately a balancing exercise, with 
various relevant factors having to be weighed against one another. Rule 
5.2 makes clear that the factors in Rule 4 are relevant to determining 
whether the seller has an obligation under Rule 5.1 to comply with local 
standards. Rule 5.2 goes further and identifies other factors, in addition to 
those in Rule 4, that are specific to the question whether the seller has an 
obligation to comply with local standards applicable at a particular place.  
5.4. One such context specific factor is presented in Rule 5.2(a): 
namely, whether the seller knew or could not have been unaware of the 
relevant standard at the place of the intended use. If so, this factor points 
to it being reasonable and fair to expect the seller to comply with local 
standards.85 This is so particularly under Article 35(2)(b) as the seller’s 
actual or implied knowledge is likely to constitute a communication of a 
particular purpose that the goods will be used in a particular place:86 
without compliance with the standards in that place, affecting the use of 
the goods, they cannot be used there. However, there may be other 
relevant but competing factors, such as the buyer’s having equal or greater 
expertise than that of the seller and/or the standards being complex and 
different depending on the importing country’s region. In one case,87 this 
latter set of factors prevailed over the seller’s knowledge of there being 
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local standards affecting the use of the goods, resulting in no obligation 
being implied on the seller to comply with local standards.  
2.6.2. THE SELLER’S PRIOR DEALINGS AT THAT PLACE, SUCH AS WHETHER 
THE SELLER HAD A BRANCH OR SUBSIDIARY OR PROMOTED GOODS 
OF THE SAME KIND AT THAT PLACE 
5.5. The seller’s prior dealings at the place of the intended use of the 
goods is relevant to determining whether the seller: had actual or implied 
knowledge of the existence of local standards, affecting the use of the 
goods, at that place; and an obligation to comply with those standards.88 
In addition to showing the relevance of this factor, Rule 5.2(b) gives 
examples of such prior dealings. They include the cases where the seller 
had a branch or subsidiary in the place of the intended use of the goods 
or its prior experience of promoting the goods of the same kind at that 
place.89     
2.6.3. WHETHER THE STANDARD AT THAT PLACE IS THE SAME AS THAT AT 
THE SELLER’S PLACE OF BUSINESS 
5.6. According to Rule 5.2(c), whether the standard at that place is 
the same as that at the seller’s place of business is relevant to whether the 
seller has an obligation to comply with the local standard at the place of 
the intended use of the goods. The relevance of this factor varies 
depending on which provision in Article 35(2) is applicable. As far as 
Article 35(2)(b) is concerned, in itself the fact of the standard being the 
same in the place of use of the goods and in the seller’s place of business 
adds nothing to the seller’s knowledge of a particular purpose. If the seller 
has knowledge of the place of the intended use of the goods (Rule 5.1(a)) 
and, where applicable, the standard there (Rule 5.2(a)), the seller’s liability 
flows from Rule 5.1(a) and Rule 5.2(a) (and possibly Rule 5.2(b)). In this 
situation, the fact that the standard is the same in both places is of no 
significance. If the seller has no knowledge of the place of use of the 
goods, the fall-back guidance in Rule 5.1(b) points to the seller’s obligation 
to comply with the standard in the buyer’s place of business. In this case, 
the mere fact that the standard in the seller’s place of business is the same 
as that in the buyer’s place of business changes nothing in terms of the 
seller’s knowledge of a particular purpose of the use of the goods (the first 
part of Article 35(2)(b)). However, this factor is relevant to the ‘reliance 
on the skill and judgement’ provision (the second part of Article 35(2)(b))90 
because it weakens the seller’s ability to argue that the buyer did not rely 
or that it was unreasonable for the buyer to rely on the seller’s skill and 
judgement. The standard in the seller’s place of business being the same 
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as that in the place of use of the goods normally demonstrate that the seller 
has the required skill and judgement to comply with it.  
5.7. This factor is directly relevant to determining the ‘ordinary use’ 
(Article 35(2)(a)) or the ‘usual manner’ of containment or packaging 
(Article 35(2)(d)). Since the seller’s place of business and the place of the 
intended use of the goods are the places that are relevant to the parties’ 
contract, the ‘ordinary use’ of the goods or their ‘usual manner’ of 
containment or packaging should be defined in a way that is compliant 
with the standard applicable in both these places.91 Put differently, these 
two places and the same standard applicable in them constitute the 
relevant context with reference to which the ‘ordinary use’ or ‘usual 
manner’ of containment or packaging should be determined.92 
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